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Abstract
If labor markets operated entirely frictionless, productivity premiums associated with
diﬀerent worker characteristics would equal the wage premiums earned by workers possess-
ing those characteristics. Using matched employer-employee data from the manufacturing
sector of three sub-Saharan countries, we evaluate to what extent the two premiums diﬀer
for four characteristics that are clearly related to human capital: schooling, training, experi-
ence, and tenure. Equality holds strongly and even surprisingly well for ﬁrms in Zimbabwe
(the most developed country in the sample), but not at all in Tanzania (the least devel-
oped country), while results in Kenya are intermediate. Where equality fails, the pattern
is for general human capital characteristics (schooling, experience) to receive a wage return
that exceeds the productivity return, while the reverse applies to more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital characteristics (training, tenure). Schooling tends to be over-rewarded, even though
large productivity gains are consistently associated with formal employee training programs.
Wages tend to rise with experience, while productivity gains are mostly associated with
tenure. We demonstrate the remarkable robustness of the ﬁndings controlling, among other
things, for sampling errors, nonlinear eﬀects, and non-wage beneﬁts. Localized labor markets
and imperfect substitutability of diﬀerent worker-types provide a partial explanations for the
estimated gap between the wage and productivity premiums.
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In the textbook economics world, markets are the most eﬃcient institution to allocate scarce
resources. They clear all the time, equalizing demand and supply, and proﬁt opportunities
are arbitraged away. In particular, production factors are predicted to be paid the marginal
productivity of the market clearing factor. In the real world, there are frictions, unobservable
characteristics, adjustment costs, erroneous expectations, and maybe discrimination; all of which
can distort the market equilibrium away from eﬃcient allocation. This should not necessarily
worry us, economists, as the theory is only intended to be a stylized version of reality. However,
a systematic gap between costs (wages) and beneﬁts (productivity) can provide information
about crucial omissions from the theory.
A well-functioning labor market should perform at least two tasks: matching workers with
ﬁrms and setting wages. The ability of the labor market to allocate workers to ﬁrms or industries
with the highest productivity or the best future prospects is of particular importance for the
likely eﬀect of trade reforms, and this has been studied extensively—see Pavcnik (2002), Eslava,
et al. (2004), and Filhoz and Muendler (2006) for studies on Latin American countries. Van
Biesebroeck (2005) investigates the eﬀectiveness of labor markets in several African countries,
including the three countries studied here, in performing this task and ﬁnds that the reallocation
mechanism is less eﬀective than in the United States.
A second aspect of labor market eﬃciency is to determine a wage rate. If labor markets
function as spot markets with minimal frictions and informational asymmetries, we would ex-
pect arbitrage to equalize the remuneration of characteristics to their productivity. Otherwise,
workers are not provided with the proper incentives to invest in human capital characteristics,
such as schooling or tenure. While an important issue, it has not been studied extensively be-
cause of lack of suitable data. Employee surveys do not contain information on ﬁrm level output
and factor inputs necessary to assess productivity. Data sets of ﬁrms or plants generally lack
information on all but a few basic characteristics of their workforce, e.g. the fraction of male
workers.
Matched employer-employee data sets contain the necessary information, but these are not
widely available.1 One can use the observed employees to estimate average values of worker char-
acteristics by employer. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999) pioneered the approach, jointly
estimating a plant level wage equation with a production function. Using U.S. administrative
record information, they test for equality of the wage and productivity premiums associated
with a number of characteristics. They only ﬁnd a discrepancy for the gender dummy: women
are estimated to be only 16% less productive than their male coworkers, but paid 45% less.
The bulk of the evidence for developed countries points towards equal wage and productivity
1A conference symposium in the Monthly Labor Review (July 1998) and the book by Haltiwanger, et al. (1999)
provide overviews.
1returns for most characteristics.2 Most recently, using 1990 U.S. data, Hellerstein and Neumark
(2004) conﬁrms that the wage gap between males and females exceeds the productivity gap. In
contrast, the lower wages for blacks are in line with productivity estimates, and even though
‘some college’ education only attracts a 43% wage premium while it is associated with a 67%
productivity boost, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. Similar work for France in
P´ erez-Duarte, et al. (2001) and for Israel in Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) ﬁnds no gender
discrimination. The only characteristic with a wage premium signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
productivity eﬀect is age in France, older workers are overpaid, while engineers are underpaid
in Israel.
For developing countries, Jones (2001) estimates a ﬁrm level production function jointly with
an individual-level wage equations for Ghana.3 She ﬁnds that women are 42% to 62% less
productive and paid 12% to 15% less. No formal test is reported, but the standard errors are
fairly large. Her focus is on the reward for an extra year of schooling, which is estimated to equal
the productivity gain associated with education, both are 7% per year. When discrete levels of
education attainment are used, the results are ambiguous. The diﬀerences in point estimates
are large, but especially the coeﬃcients in the production function are estimated imprecisely
and none of the formal tests ﬁnds a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence.4 Bigsten, et al. (2000)
gauge the link between wages and productivity indirectly. First, they estimate the returns to
education in ﬁve sub-Saharan countries using a standard wage equation. Then, they separately
estimate the production function, including lagged levels of education as a proxy for human
capital. They ﬁnd that the implied rate of return to human capital is very low, in particular
only a fraction of the return to physical capital.
Labor market frictions are likely to be at least as important in developing countries as in
more mature economies. As stressed by Fafchamps (1997) in the introduction to a symposium
on “Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa”, one should be careful not to assume outright that markets
are eﬃcient, regardless of the institutions required to perform their function. The contribution
of this paper is foremost to provide information on the wage-productivity gap for three more
sub-Saharan countries: Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. All three countries are relatively poor,
but during the sample period the GDP per capita for Zimbabwe exceeded that for Tanzania by
a factor of six, while Kenya was intermediately developed. We focus on four human capital
characteristics: experience, schooling, tenure, and employee training programs. The latter two
are adjusted continuously while workers are in the workforce. A crucial function of the wage
setting is to provide workers with the correct investment incentives for these.
Following the methodology in Hellerstein, et al. (1999), we compare the salary remuneration
2Limited to discretely measured characteristics.
3No details are given on the assumptions on the variance-covariance matrix when the individual and ﬁrm level
data is combined. Van Biesebroeck (2007) outlines one possible set of assumptions and ﬁnds results in line with
those in this paper.
4Many diﬀerences are large in absolute value—ﬁve of the eight estimated diﬀerentials exceed 20%—but the
direction of the diﬀerence varies by schooling level.
2for workers’ characteristics to the contribution the same characteristics make to output. As
the analysis is carried out at the ﬁrm level, the nature of the comparison is implicitly between
wage bill and output diﬀerences between ﬁrms that vary in the average characteristics of their
workforce. A methodological contribution of the paper is to incorporate a consistent aggregation
method to the ﬁrm level when human capital for individual workers varies with continuously
measured characteristics. This is particularly important when diminishing returns are allowed
for. For example, we show that when a squared term on experience is included in the Mincer
wage equation, one needs to include the average variance of experience within ﬁrms in the ﬁrm
level wage regression.
The main ﬁndings are summarized here. In Tanzania, the poorest country of the three,
the wage premiums deviate substantially and signiﬁcantly from the corresponding productiv-
ity premiums. The wedge between wage and productivity returns are much smaller and all
are insigniﬁcant in relatively more developed Zimbabwe. Results for Kenya, an intermediate
country in level of development, are intermediate: equal remuneration can be rejected for some
characteristics (e.g. experience), but not for others (e.g. schooling). The breakdown in correct
remuneration is most pronounced for characteristics that contributed to general—as opposed to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc—human capital: schooling and experience.
Moreover, the way in which equality fails to hold is similar for the experience-tenure and the
schooling-training comparison. Contrast the pattern of wage and productivity premiums for pre-
employment schooling (building mostly general skills) and formal employee training programs
(building more ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital). The productivity advantage for ﬁrms that employ
a lot of ‘trained’ workers is large and relatively uniform across countries, ranging from 45% in
Zimbabwe to 75% in Kenya. Only a fraction of these productivity gains accrue to the worker
in the form of higher salary in Tanzania (only one sixteenth of the total) or in Kenya (one
quarter). Trained Zimbabwean workers, however, receive a salary premium that exceeds the
direct productivity gain, possibly because the eﬀects spill over and improve the productivity
of co-workers. Note that the productivity eﬀect of training could be due to selection or to
human capital building. In contrast, productivity returns to schooling are modest in Tanzania
and Kenya (1.6% and 2.1% per year), even though each additional year of formal eduction is
rewarded by large salary increases, 6.6% in Tanzania and even 9.4% in Kenya. In Zimbabwe, the
productivity and salary premiums associated with schooling are large and of similar magnitude.
Such a mismatch between productivity eﬀects and salary compensation will provide the wrong
incentives for workers, from a social point of view.
A number of robustness checks indicate that the failure for wage and productivity premi-
ums to equalize is not driven by the way characteristics are measured, the functional form of
the production function, the controls included in the equations, nor by diminishing returns
to characteristics or sampling error. Unobservable components to the worker remuneration or
measurement error in capital are also unlikely to cause the patterns.
Allowing for imperfect substitution between workers with high and low levels of experience
3reduces the gap for schooling, but the gap for experience remains. When we perform the
analysis including only ﬁrms from a single geographic area in each country, the gaps diminish
substantially for Kenya (Nairobi), suggesting that localized labor markets could be important,
but for Tanzania (Arusha) the diﬀerences remain. We also discuss frictions in the matching
process between workers and ﬁrms and long-term contracts which could in principle explain the
gap between instantaneous wage and productivity returns.5 It is unclear, however, why these
issues should be disproportionately important for Tanzania.
There are several important debates in development or labor economics that would beneﬁt
from a better understanding of the relationship between wages and productivity. First, Knight
and Sabot (1987) argue that the higher output growth in Kenya in the ﬁrst decades since
independence—relative to the otherwise similar Tanzania—can be explained to a large extent by
the diﬀerential access to secondary education. They advocate increased investment in education
as an important tool for development. The Tanzanian ﬁrms in this sample have, on average,
a more educated workforce, but the productivity eﬀects of schooling fall far short of the wage
eﬀects. It illustrates that higher education does not translate automatically into higher output.
Second, measurement of productivity growth relies explicitly on the equality of relative wages
and relative productivity. Labor productivity growth is calculated by subtracting labor growth
from output growth, weighing categories of workers by their wage shares, see for example Jor-
genson and Griliches (1967). If the equality between wages and productivity fails to hold sys-
tematically in developing countries, productivity growth measures will be biased.
Third, the debate on the importance of ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital investments as captured by
the return to tenure—see Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005)—is centered around the
wage equation. Implicitly it is assumed that wage increases must reﬂect productivity advances.
On the same topic, Brown (1989) ﬁnds that wage increases within a plant occur predominantly
when on-the-job training is taking place. He concludes that such pattern of remuneration sup-
ports the link between wages and productivity, as opposed to contractual reasons for such a
remuneration pattern as stressed by theoretical principal-agent models. Direct estimates of
wage and productivity premiums would contribute useful information to this debate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The measurement framework to compare
wage and productivity premiums associated with worker characteristics is introduced in Section
2. The countries and the employer-employee data are discussed next, in Section 3. Baseline
results are presented in Section 4 and several checks in Section 5 illustrate the robustness of the
ﬁndings. In Section 6, a number of reasons that might explain why equality fails to hold are
explored. Section 7 concludes.
5Yet an alternative channel, proﬁt sharing between ﬁrms and workers, is discussed by Velenchik (1997) in a
study of urban labor markets in Zimbabwe. She provides evidence that proﬁt growth has a positive coeﬃcient in
an individual wage growth regression.
42 A measurement framework
The methodology owes a great deal to Hellerstein, et al. (1999). If labor markets are eﬃcient,
operate as a spot market, and ﬁrms are minimizing costs, the wage premium of a worker should
equal its productivity premium. Barring imperfect information, any diﬀerence will be arbitraged
away. Both premiums can be identiﬁed by jointly estimating a wage equation and production
function at the ﬁrm level. As an example, assume that the average productivity of male workers
exceeds the productivity of female workers by φM percentage. With perfect substitutability
between men and women, which is relaxed later (see Section 6.1), the production function can
be written as a function of capital and both types of labor,6
Q = A f(K, LF + (1 + φM)LM).
The ﬁrst order conditions for cost minimizing input choices of the ﬁrm entail that in an eﬃcient

















Jointly estimating the wage (λM) and productivity (φM) premiums associated with each
characteristic makes it possible to test for the equality in equation (1) for several characteristics
individually or jointly. Traditionally, researchers have been concerned with a potential bias
introduced by unobserved worker ability in the wage equation or unobserved productivity in the
production function. Joint estimation should alleviate such concerns as the bias works in the
same direction in both equations. The unobservables are to a large extent two sides of the same
coin.7 We are only interested in the relative magnitudes of the coeﬃcients in each equation,
which should be less aﬀected. In the robustness checks, see Section 5.2, this is discussed further.
Discrete characteristics
Assuming the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the production function can be written in loga-
rithms as8
lnQ = lnA + αK lnK + αL ln ˜ L + q.
Male and female workers are combined in the labor aggregate ˜ L, where each type of employee
(LF or LM) is multiplied by its relative productivity level (1 or 1+φM). It will be useful to
6Firm and time subscripts are omitted from all equations and derivation. In the next section, the ﬁrm level
panel data used for estimation is discussed‘.
7Frazer (2001) exploits this assumption to control for unobserved ability in the wage equation with the pro-
ductivity residual.
8It is straightforward to generalize the methodology to other functional forms. We report results for a translog
production function in the robustness checks, see Section 5.2.
5rewrite ˜ L as
˜ L = LF + (1 + φM)LM




The last term is simply the fraction of male workers in the total labor force (L = LF + LM).
Substituting (2) in the production function allows estimation of the gender productivity gap
by nonlinear least squares from just the proportion of male workers in each ﬁrm and the usual
output and input variables.
For joint estimation, we derive a ﬁrm level wage equation consistent with the Mincer (1974)
model of human capital. Sticking with the earlier example, deﬁne a wage equation at the
individual level as,
Wi = wFFi + wMMi.
The average wage paid to women is wF—Fi is dummy that takes on a value of one if individual
i is a women—and wM to men. Summing over all employees at the ﬁrm gives an expression for
the total wage bill,
W = wFLF + wMLM








Taking logarithms and adding an additive error, representing measurement error in the wage




= lnwF + ln[1 + λM
LM
L
] + w. (3)
Nonlinear least squares estimation will produce an estimate of the average baseline wage (for
female workers) and of the gender wage premium. The only information needed is the average
wage and the proportion of male workers at the ﬁrm.
Generalizing this approach to construct a wage and production equation with workers that
diﬀer on more dimensions is limited by the data. At the very least, we want to diﬀerentiate
workers by gender, experience and schooling. If each characteristic divides workers into two
groups, three characteristics deﬁne eight categories of workers (unexperienced, educated males,
etc.). Given that we observe a maximum of ten workers in each ﬁrm, the proportion of each ﬁrm’s
workforce that falls in either of the eight categories will be estimated extremely inaccurately.
If we are willing to assume that for each characteristic the relative number of workers, wages,
and productivity in either group is the same for each of the four possible groups deﬁned by the
other two characteristics, we can avoid this type of dimensional problem. In eﬀect, this is an
6“independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption on the relative number of workers and the
wage and productivity returns for each characteristic. We have to assume, for example, that the
relative number of male to female workers, is the same in each experience-schooling category,
and similarly for the relative wages and productivity by gender. If gender is indicated by M
or F subscript, experience by Y or X (young versus high experience), and schooling by U or S








































and similarly for all other characteristics, e.g. LMY U/LMY S = LFY U/LFY S = ...
These assumptions allows us to simplify the labor aggregate in the production function from
eight additive terms, one for each worker category, to three multiplicative factors, one for each
characteristic:
˜ L = LFY S + (1 + φFXS)LFXS + (1 + φMY S)LMY S + ... + (1 + φMXU)LMXU
= L [1 + φM
LM
L
] [1 + φX
LX
L




The assumptions on the wage premiums in (4) are customarily made in Mincer wage regressions.
Aggregating as before leads to additive terms for all charateristics in the ﬁrm level log wage
regression as well. Controlling for further characteristics in human capital, now requires adding
additional factors to (5). With more characteristics, it becomes even more indispensable to make
the assumptions, as in (4), that all ratios are equal conditional on the other characteristics.
These assumptions cannot be tested, or we would have avoided making them. In the small
sample of employees we observe at each ﬁrm, some ratios will obviously not be equal, but this
can readily arise if only a limited number of employees are sampled.9 The assumption of perfect
substitutability between workers with diﬀerent characteristics is relaxed below, in Section 6.1.




= λ0 + ln(1 + λM
LM
L
) + ln(1 + λX
LX
L
) + (1 + λS
LS
L
) + w (6)
lnQ = α0 + αK lnK
+ αL[lnL + ln(1 + φM
LM
L
) + ln(1 + φX
LX
L
) + ln(1 + φS
LS
L
)] + q (7)
where λ0 = wFY U is the base salary for a female, inexperienced, uneducated worker. λM,λX, and
λS are the wage premiums associated with gender, experience (high versus low), and education
9In some cases, enough workers are observed that the assumptions in (4) can be rejected, e.g. for some small
ﬁrms all employees are sampled. To rationalize such observations, we have to invoke some measurement error.
7(high versus low). Ideally we would like to weight the workers by hours worked to construct
the employment fractions, but this variable is only available at the ﬁrm level averaged over the
entire workforce. Equations (6) and (7) are estimated jointly with Zellner’s seemingly unrelated
regression estimator, allowing for correlation between the two error terms.
Continuous characteristics
Virtually all previous studies use only discrete characteristics, which require a separate additive
term for each type of worker, e.g. high versus low levels of schooling: (1 + φS
LS
L ). If schooling
were deﬁned more ﬁnely, e.g. distinguishing between elementary (benchmark), secondary (Ss),





L ). Clearly, with only ten workers observed per ﬁrm, this approach has
limits.
When characteristics vary continuously, such as schooling or experience, the derivation of
both (ﬁrm level) equations is more complicated. Frazer (2001) demonstrates how to derive
a human capital term in the production function consistent with Mincer (1974). The labor
composite ˜ L in (5) can be written as the sum over all workers Lj with each type of worker
j multiplied by its human capital component. The productivity adjustment takes the form of
eφ0+φSSj+φXXj, if types diﬀer by schooling and experience. In the continuous case, φS measures
how eﬀective labor varies with schooling, (∂ ln ˜ L/∂S). The productivity eﬀect of schooling also
depends on the importance of labor in production, ∂ lnQ/∂S = αLφS. A ﬁrst order Taylor
approximation of the production function with the nonlinear human capital factors produces
a log-linear equation.10 The logarithm of output is a function of capital and labor, also in
logarithms, and the average schooling attainment and experience over all workers in the ﬁrm:
lnQ = α0 + αK lnK + αL [ln ¯ L + φX ¯ X + φS ¯ S ] +  (70)
The derivation of the ﬁrm level wage equation is similar, with λS and λX capturing the
(marginal) wage premiums associated with schooling and experience (∂ lnWi/∂S and ∂ lnWi/∂X).
With continuously measured variables, arbitrarily cutoﬀ levels are avoided. For education, plau-
sible cutoﬀ levels are suggested at years when degrees are conferred, but for experience or tenure
the classiﬁcation of workers is arbitrary. Gender and other inherently discrete characteristics
can be taken into account as before, replacing ¯ L in (70) by L (1 + φM
LM
L
). The limited model




= λ0 + ln(1 + λM
LM
L
) + λXX + λSS + w (8)
10Frazer (2001) further illustrates that a second order approximation of the production function consistent with
a Mincer wage regression with continuous experience and schooling measures involves the inclusion of variance
and covariance terms of the characteristics by ﬁrm in the equations. Details on the derivation are in the Appendix.
Because of the limited number of workers per ﬁrm in our sample (a maximum of 10), we refrain from doing so.
When the returns for characteristics are modeled as quadratic instead of linear, see Section 5.3, we are forced to
introduce a second order approximation.
8lnQ = α0 + αK lnK + αL[lnL + ln(1 + φM
LM
L
) + φXX + φSS] + q. (9)
The full models adds continuous terms for years of tenure (φTT) and a discrete term for the





The three countries included in the sample—Tanzania, Kenya, and Zimbabwe—are middle-
sized former British colonies in East Africa that diﬀered substantially in level of development.11
Although the World Bank classiﬁed all three as low income, their GDP per capita (in PPP in
1992) ranged from $395 in Tanzania, less than half the $1089 of Kenya, to a level almost six
times as high in Zimbabwe (GDP per capita of $2459). The diﬀerences are smaller comparing
the U.N. human development index, which also takes education and life expectancy into account,
but the ordering is the same. In the 1992 ranking (published in 1994), Tanzania occupies the
148th place with 0.306, putting it in the low development category. Kenya and Zimbabwe rank
rather closely at places 125 and 121, with scores of 0.434 and 0.474, near the bottom of the
medium development group.12
[Table 1]
The diﬀerent development levels of the countries is mirrored in the share of workers employed
in industry.13 Only 4.7% of employment in Tanzania is in industry, while it is almost twice as
high in Zimbabwe (8.6%) and intermediate in Kenya (7.3%). In Tanzania, the transition from
agriculture to other sectors had only just begun; agriculture comprised almost half the workforce
at the end of the 1990s. In Kenya, the transformation was in full swing; the employment share
of agriculture declined from 42% in 1975 to 27.5% by the sample period. Zimbabwe, in contrast,
has seen a stable 18.5% of its workforce employed in agriculture for the last 25 years.
Given that Zimbabwe is much more advanced in its industrial transformation, it is not sur-
prising that it far surpasses the other two countries in GDP per capita. The diﬀerence in labor
productivity in industry is even more stark. While industry workers in Kenya produce twice as
much as Tanzanian workers, Zimbabwe’s output per worker outstrips Tanzania by a factor of
11Unfortunately, only three countries could be included in the analysis. A partial analysis was possible with
data from Cameroon (almost as developed as Zimbabwe) and Burundi (even less developed than Tanzania),
but the sample sizes are smaller, some variables (e.g. capital) are measured less accurately, and other variables
(e.g. training in Burundi) are missing. Results for these countries are in between the extremes of Tanzania and
Zimbabwe. The failure of the equalities to hold exactly is more pronounced for Burundi than Cameroon: the
p-values for the joint test in Table 2(a) were respectively 0.03 and 0.22.
12Canada topped the ranking with a score of 0.932 and Guinea closed it with a score of 0.191.
13Manufacturing employment that matched manufacturing value added was not available for Tanzania in 1992.
91 to 7 and Kenya 1 to 4. It underscores the importance of developing a strong manufacturing
sector. World Bank (2000) statistics show that manufacturing workers in Tanzania earn on
average 3.5 times more than agricultural workers, while the ratio stands at 5.7 in Kenya and
even at 9.9 in Zimbabwe.
Infrastructure statistics, from the World Bank Development Report, conﬁrm the diﬀerent
levels of development of the three countries. Zimbabwe has 22km of paved highways per 1000
km2 of land, while the corresponding numbers for Kenya and Tanzania are 15km and 4km.
The same ranking is preserved in kilometers of railroad by area, at respectively eight, ﬁve, and
four kilometers, or airports per million inhabitants, 1.4 in Zimbabwe, 0.6 in Kenya and 0.3
in Tanzania. In fact, almost any conceivable statistic that one expects to be correlated with
development produces the same ranking: access to clean water, telephone penetration, school
enrollment, infant mortality, etc.14
Tanzania and Kenya each counted approximately 25 million inhabitants, while Zimbabwe only
had 10 million in 1992. The manufacturing sector, which we will focus on, is more evenly sized
because of its much greater importance in Zimbabwe. All countries count between 126,000 and
188,000 manufacturing workers. A stratiﬁed sample of manufacturing ﬁrms in three consecutive
years provides the micro data used in the analysis.
Firms
The ﬁrm level data was collected between 1992 and 1995 by three diﬀerent research teams,
coordinated by the Regional Program of Enterprise Development at the World Bank.15 Firms
were sampled to give the ﬁrm of each manufacturing worker equal probability to be included
in the sample—an implicit stratiﬁcation by employment size. Approximately 200 ﬁrms were
surveyed each year in each country, covering four broadly deﬁned manufacturing sectors: food
processing, textile and clothing, wood and furniture, and metal and equipment. A maximum of
10 employees per ﬁrm were interviewed each year.16 While ﬁrms could be linked over time as a
panel, this was not possible for the workers.
The resulting sample is an unbalanced panel of ﬁrms with, on average, 110 to 183 observations
per year in each country. In the ﬁrst year, the ﬁrms employed 19,383 to 58,108 workers and 619
to 1206 of them were interviewed. A large fraction of the manufacturing sector is covered by this
sample. The value added produced by the sample ﬁrms amounts to 31% of oﬃcial manufacturing
GDP in Tanzania, 17% in Kenya, and 26% in Zimbabwe. The share of manufacturing workers
that are employed by ﬁrms included in the sample is substantially lower in the ﬁrst two countries,
14Only life expectancy at birth gives a reverse ranking, but this is due to the staggering HIV infection rate,
aﬀecting one third of the adult population in Zimbabwe and almost one sixth in Kenya.
15The ﬁrm level data for the three countries is available online at http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/datasets/main.html,
which is maintained by the Centre for the Study of African Economics at the University of Oxford. On the same
site is also a data appendix with information on the survey, the sampling frame, and the variable construction.
16In Zimbabwe, workers were only interviewed in the ﬁrst and second year.
10as large ﬁrms tend to have higher labor productivity (Van Biesebroeck, 2005). The stratiﬁed
sampling yielded signiﬁcantly larger than average ﬁrms. The absence of reliable ﬁrm censuses
in these countries makes it impossible to compare with the universe, but the average ﬁrm size
in these countries is surely smaller than in the U.S. manufacturing sector, where ﬁrms employed
on average 61 workers in 1993 (OECD, 1995).
The diﬀerences in level of development between the countries are equally apparent when we
compare the ﬁrms in the sample, see Van Biesebroeck (2005) for a more elaborate comparison.
The median ﬁrm in Tanzania achieved only 38% of the labor productivity of the median ﬁrm
in Kenya, while labor productivity in Zimbabwe is 42% higher than in Kenya. Total factor
productivity numbers show similar diﬀerences when capital intensity is taken into account. The
median ﬁrm in Kenya is twice as productive as in Tanzania, but achieves only two thirds of the
productivity level of the median ﬁrm in Zimbabwe. The salary diﬀerences between the countries
match the labor productivity diﬀerences rather well. Workers in Tanzania earn 27.4% of the
average salary in Zimbabwe, while the labor productivity at their employers stands at 26.8%.
Salaries in Kenya, on average $120, are slightly below what one would predict from the relative
labor productivity, which would imply a salary of approximately $140. The statistics for the
sample conﬁrm that Zimbabwe is by far the most developed country of the three, while Tanzania
is lagging far behind.
The following variables will be used in the analysis. Value added, the output measure, is total
sales minus raw materials, intermediate inputs and energy. Labor input is the total number of
full-time employees and hours is the average monthly hours worked per worker, which is only
available at the ﬁrm level. Capital is the replacement value of the plant and equipment at the
end of the year. Nominal variables are deﬂated with GDP deﬂators from the World Bank (2000).
Summary statistics for the ﬁrst year of the sample are in Table 1.
Workers
The remainder of Table 1 provides averages and standard errors for the worker level variables.
The number of workers interviewed in each ﬁrm averages around six and varies between one
and seventeen, but only for a few Tanzanian ﬁrms more than ten workers are included. The
monthly salary is deﬂated with the same deﬂator as value added. Schooling is measured both
continuously, in years, and as the fraction of employees that completed some high school. As
we separately observe age, years of schooling, and graduation year we can calculate a labor
force experience variable. Tenure is the number of years with the current employer. In addition
to the continuous variables in years, a discrete variable measuring the proportion of workers
in the ﬁrm with higher than median experience and tenure is reported as well. The training
dummy captures completion of any formal training program, excluding on-the-job training, but
including training received at former employers.
Workers in Zimbabwe work on average in larger ﬁrms, are slightly older, stay longer with
11the same ﬁrm and are more likely to receive (or choose to enroll in) formal training once they
are employed. The sample of workers in Kenya is the most dominated by males. In Tanzania,
workers receive the lowest salaries, but paradoxically they have the highest years of schooling.
Information on productivity is only available at the ﬁrm level and individual wages have
to be aggregated to carry out the comparison with productivity. Identiﬁcation of the wage
and productivity premiums associated with worker characteristics comes from correlation across
ﬁrms of the composition of the workforce and average salaries or output. The working paper
version, Van Biesebroeck (2003), shows results for the employee level wage equation to conﬁrm
that the aggregation does not obscure how an individual’s characteristics are rewarded.17
Individual wage regression with least squares capture both variation within and between ﬁrms.
For example, the higher salary for male workers can be the result of men getting on average
higher salaries than women within a given ﬁrm or men can be disproportionately employed in
ﬁrms that pay higher salaries, a between eﬀect, even without diﬀerential pay by gender. When
we separately identify the magnitude of both eﬀects, we ﬁnd that in almost all cases they work
in the same direction. Two variables warrant caution: the gender dummy in Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, and tenure in Zimbabwe.
The average male worker receives a higher salary in all three countries. In Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, this is solely the result of higher wages for men within ﬁrms. The pay diﬀerential is
reduced by sorting of men towards lower-paying employers. Comparing average earnings across
ﬁrms will show a negative wage premium for men, because ﬁrms that employ a high proportion
of men pay lower salaries on average, even though men employed in those ﬁrms still earn more
than their female coworkers. This complicates the interpretation of the gender dummy.
A positive coeﬃcient on tenure can be the result of ﬁrms raising salaries for employees with
high tenure. On the other hand, workers could choose to stay for a longer time with employers
that oﬀer high pay in general. Both interpretations are plausible, but only the second one is
backed up by the data in Zimbabwe. In each of the three countries, the between-ﬁrm eﬀect—
which is what we will pick up with the ﬁrm level regressions—dominates the total.
4 Results
The estimation results by country for equations (8) and (9) with continuously measured expe-
rience and schooling are in Table 2(a). The corresponding results for discrete characteristics,
in Table 2(b), will be discussed below. In each speciﬁcation, hours worked and time, industry,
and location dummies are added as controls to both the wage equation and production function.
The input coeﬃcients in the production function are estimated precisely and the point estimates
are plausible. Returns to scale are estimated to be moderately increasing, but only in Kenya
17A full survey of the returns to education estimated from Mincer wage regressions in sub-Saharan Africa is in
Appleton, Hoddinott, and Mackinnon (1996).
12do they signiﬁcantly exceed unity (at the 5% level). The relative importance of capital and the
labor aggregate is estimated rather similarly in each country. The ﬁt for the production function
is notably better, with R-squares at least twice as high as for the wage equation. In contrast,
standard errors on the human capital characteristics are invariable lower in the wage equation,
although the diﬀerence is slight for Zimbabwe.
The coeﬃcients on the gender dummy tend to be estimated imprecisely with varying signs
and magnitudes. Firms that employ a high proportion of men are more productive in Kenya,
but as discussed earlier, it might be because men are more productive or because they tend
to work for more productive ﬁrms. Regardless of the cause, diﬀerences in pay by gender do
not correspond well to productivity diﬀerences. Perhaps surprisingly for Africa, the results
suggest that men are underpaid, relative to their productivity, although the diﬀerences are not
statistically signiﬁcant. P-values for a Wald test for equality between the gender coeﬃcients in
the wage equation and production function—testing the equality in equation (1)—are reported
at the bottom of Table 2(a). Only for Kenya can we reject equality, and even there only at a
10% signiﬁcance level. In the following speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients on the gender dummies
are unstable and we will not focus much on them.
[Table 2]
The returns to experience and schooling in the wage equation, on the other hand, are pre-
cisely estimated and correspond well to the results at the individual level, see Van Biesebroeck
(2003). Salaries rise substantially with experience in Tanzania and Kenya, but not in Zimbabwe,
where education is rewarded higher than in the two other countries. At least compared to the
productivity premiums, the wage premiums are estimated similarly in the three countries. The
eﬀects of experience and education in the production function both rise with the level of devel-
opment. In Tanzania, experience contributes negatively to productivity, while higher education
contributes nothing. In Kenya, there is no discernable eﬀect of experience on production, while
schooling contributes positively, although not in proportion to the wage premium paid for ed-
ucation. In Zimbabwe, the individual return—in the form of higher salary—and the return to
the ﬁrm—higher output—associated with experience and schooling are very close.
The gaps between the salary and productivity premium for experience and schooling are
largest in Tanzania, at respectively 4.4% and 6.1%, and they are also sizeable in Kenya, at 2.6%
and 4.0%. In Zimbabwe, the gaps are 0.8% and 1.4% and equality of the returns cannot be
rejected at all with a formal statistical tests. The p-values are 0.36 and 0.67. In the two less
developed countries, equality of the returns to experience can ﬁrmly be rejected, even at a 1%
signiﬁcance level. The same holds for schooling in Tanzania (at a 10% signiﬁcance level), but
not in Kenya. The diﬀerent ﬁndings cannot simply be attributed to less precisely estimated
coeﬃcients for Zimbabwe, which has only slightly higher standard errors. The joint test for
equality of the returns to each of the three characteristics conﬁrms the pattern. In Tanzania, by
far the least developed economy, the p-value of the Wald test for joint equality is only 1%. In
13Kenya, the p-value still tends towards rejection at 5%, largely due to the high wage premium for
experience that is not backed up by any productivity gains. In Zimbabwe, none of the diﬀerences
between the estimated coeﬃcients is even remotely statistically signiﬁcant, and the same is true
for the joint test.
As mentioned, the largest discrepancy between the wage and productivity premium is for
experience. In the two least developed countries, workers get substantial pay increases over
their career, which are not backed up by any discernible productivity eﬀect. In Tanzania,
productivity is even estimated to decline with experience, which could represent an age eﬀect.
The wage premium for schooling exceeds its eﬀect on productivity in each country, but the
extent diﬀers widely. An extra year of schooling raises the average salary in Tanzania by 5.9%
even though there is no productivity eﬀect to speak of. In Kenya, the return to schooling is
much larger, 9.1%, which exceeds the productivity it brings the employer by more than half.
In Zimbabwe, the excess return to schooling is kept to a moderate 1.4% per year, less than a
quarter of the average productivity gain associated with an extra year of schooling.
Including tenure and training in the wage equation and production function, identiﬁes ad-
ditional instances where characteristics are rewarded diﬀerently from their productivity eﬀect.
The estimates are reported in Table 3(a). The coeﬃcients on the gender dummy have changed
somewhat, but are still estimated inaccurately. Experience is still rewarded with higher salary
increases than the productivity eﬀect warrants, especially in Tanzania, to some extent in Kenya,
but not at all in Zimbabwe. The wage premium associated with schooling increases slightly
in the poorest two countries, while some of the eﬀect in Zimbabwe is taken over by the new
variables, most likely training. The gap in wage and productivity premium associated with
schooling decreases for Tanzania, but it increases for Kenya. Only in Zimbabwe are the two
premiums similar, as before.
[Table 3]
The ﬁrst added variable, tenure, measures the number of years an employee has been with
his current employer. Even conditional on experience, an extra year of tenure raises the wage
by 1.7% in Zimbabwe. This closely matches the corresponding increase in output (1.6%). The
gap between the individual and ﬁrm return is, again, largest in Tanzania and intermediate in
Kenya. The same pattern holds for formal training. In the two least developed countries, workers
that have received training are paid more, but they receive only a fraction of the beneﬁt a ﬁrm
reaps from training. In Zimbabwe, the wage premium for workers exceeds the productivity eﬀect.
Combined with a higher return to tenure than to experience, the compensation patterns will help
to reduce worker turnover, especially of those valuable employees that received training. This
is borne out by a cursory look at the correlation between training and tenure at the individual
level. Controlling for experience, workers with training had half a year higher tenure with their
current employer, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. The relationship is particularly
strong in Zimbabwe.
14It is illuminating to compare the size and composition of the year on year salary and produc-
tivity increases across countries. A Tanzanian employee that remains with the same employer
will see his salary grow by 0.6% per year on average, while the salary increase would be higher
if he changed employers. The productivity of workers is estimated to decline by almost 3%
per year and this is hardly inﬂuenced by job changes. In Kenya, salaries for loyal employees
increase by 3.2% a year, approximately one sixth more than for workers that change employers,
even though there is very little productivity growth, 1% if a worker does not change employers,
none otherwise. In Zimbabwe, the wage and productivity increases match remarkably well and
they mostly accrue with tenure, not with general labor market experience. When we control for
tenure, training, and education, the wage return to experience is virtually nil in Zimbabwe.
A joint test for the hypothesis that for the four observable human capital components—
experience, schooling, tenure, and training—wage premiums equal productivity premiums fol-
lows the same pattern as the joint test with the restricted set of variables in Table 2(a). Equality
is rejected for Tanzania at the 5% signiﬁcance level. For Kenya, it can only be rejected if we are
willing to tolerate a 15% signiﬁcance level. The hypothesis can never be rejected for Zimbabwe.
Relative to their productivity eﬀects, experience and schooling are over-rewarded in the two
poorest countries, while the reverse is true for training and tenure. Workers will be expected to
underinvest in the latter two characteristics. In Zimbabwe, tenure and training (in addition to
schooling) carry the highest reward, but both also bring large productivity gains. Training is
rewarded even more than the direct productivity eﬀect seems to warrant. This is not necessarily
ineﬃcient as ﬁrms might beneﬁt from spillover eﬀects to other employees or, alternatively, the
higher salary associated with training helps to retain the most experienced workers, who are
paid slightly below their marginal productivity.
It is noteworthy to point out that training is consistently associated with large productivity
eﬀects. The point estimates on the training variables in the production function are uniformly
large in Tables 3(a) and (b), but estimated imprecisely. The eﬀects range from 42% (Zimbabwe)
to 75% (Tanzania and Kenya). It is impossible to know whether this constitutes human capital
accumulation—training boosting productivity directly—or selection—ﬁrms can selectively oﬀer
training to their best employees or disproportionately choose to hire or retain workers that
received training. It is striking that these “trained” workers do not receive much of a salary
boost in Tanzania or Kenya, even though the point estimate for their productivity contribution
is higher than in Zimbabwe. While the quality of training programs could vary by country, at
least the productivity eﬀects are similar. In the vast quantity of research summarized in the last
two-volume Handbook of Development Economics and the last three-volume Handbook of Labor
Economics there is only a short discussion of on-the-job training in the chapter by Gibbons
and Waldman (1999), focussing on selection. This is in sharp contrast with the many chapters
evaluating the eﬀects of formal education. Training seems a topic worthy of further research,
especially in the developing country context.
We can group the more ﬁrm-speciﬁc aspects of human capital—tenure and training—and the
15more general human capital attributes—experience and schooling—and perform separate tests
for equality of wage and productivity premiums. This clearly identiﬁes the general characteristics
as the cause of rejection in the lesser developed countries. Firms in each country seem to reward
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics at least somewhat in relation to their productivity, all p-values are
around 0.60, although it should be noted that the eﬀects of training are estimated especially
imprecisely for Tanzania and Kenya. The diﬀerences between countries are limited to the general
characteristics, with a p-value of 0.03 for Tanzania, 0.16 for Kenya, and 0.99 for Zimbabwe.
Grouping characteristics diﬀerently—schooling and training (learning), on the one hand, and
experience and tenure (over time), on the other—points again to the importance of experience.
The failure to equalize returns to general characteristics is driven mostly by experience, not by
schooling.
Much of the sensitivity analysis in the next section will focus on the wage-productivity gap
for experience: a very large diﬀerence for Tanzania (5.0%), intermediate for Kenya (2.7%),
and almost perfect equality for Zimbabwe (0.1%). The underlying pattern is that over time
salaries increase with general experience in Tanzania and Kenya, but with ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure
in Zimbabwe. Productivity is more closely related to tenure than experience in each country.
If ﬁrms are cost-minimizing and labor markets work eﬃciently, diﬀerences between wage and
productivity eﬀects should be arbitraged away. We will investigate a number of alternative
explanations for the disparities in returns in Section 6.
5 Robustness checks
In this Section we present several robustness checks that leave the general pattern of the results
unchanged: the extent to which characteristics, especially experience, are rewarded in line with
their productivity contribution is negatively related to the level of development of the country. In
turn we look at discrete deﬁnitions for all human capital characteristics (5.1), translog production
function and additional controls (5.2), diminishing returns on schooling and experience (5.3),
sampling error (5.4), and we discuss potentially important unobservables (5.5).
5.1 Discrete variables
Qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar results are obtained when experience and
schooling are measured as discrete variables at the individual level. For experience or tenure, we
measure the proportion of the workforce in each ﬁrm above or below the median (interviewed)
worker for that country. For schooling, we measure the proportion of workers in each ﬁrm that
at least attended secondary school, but not necessarily ﬁnished it. The results with the limited
set of characteristics are in Table 2(b) and for the full model, adding tenure and training, in
Table 3(b). When discrete (dummy) variables are used for all characteristics, it is not necessary
to rely on a Taylor approximation for the ﬁrm-level production function.
16The main results go through, some even become stronger. Equality of wage and productivity
premiums is strongly rejected in Tanzania, the least developed country in the sample. The
striking negative eﬀect of experience on productivity also remains, but it now becomes weaker
as the tenure variable is introduced, as expected. In Kenya, the rejection of equality is more
strongly than using continuous variables and equality can again not be rejected in Zimbabwe.
Relative to the earlier results, the premiums in the wage and production equations are still
similar in Zimbabwe, although not as alike as in Table 2. The extent to which joint equality
of the return to characteristics can be rejected decreases with the level of development in the
country and the rejection is the strongest for experience.
The full model results with discrete characteristics conﬁrm both earlier conclusions. It
emerges even more strongly than before that the probability of rejection decreases with the
level of development. The p-value for a joint test for equality of all returns, excluding the gen-
der dummy, goes from 0.00 in Tanzania, to 0.04 in Kenya, and 0.65 in Zimbabwe. This tendency
holds most strongly for more general human capital characteristics (p-values are 0.01, 0.02, and
0.93, respectively) or for the variables that measure the accumulation of human capital over
time (p-values are 0.00, 0.05, and 0.75).
5.2 Production function
We next investigate the robustness of the results to a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the production
function. The results in the top panel of Table 4 uses a translog instead of Cobb-Douglas
production function. The labor aggregate is unchanged (log ˜ L), but quadratic and interaction
terms with capital are included. Only in Kenya are the second order terms jointly signiﬁcant.
It is no surprise then that the results go through relatively unchanged.
[Table 4]
Hellerstein and Neumark (2004) estimate a similar model using the semi-parametric Olley-
Pakes approach to control for the endogeneity of unobserved productivity in the production
function. Their results are virtually unchanged using this methodology compared to simple least
squares. Similarly, Fox and Smeets (2007) ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on worker characteristics in
the production function are barely aﬀected when the estimation method is changed from least
squares to the Olley-Pakes semi-parametric estimator. The same is true in our sample, but to
conserve space these results are not reported here (they are available upon request).
Instead, the results in the bottom panel of Table 4 are for additional controls added to both
equations. We include state and foreign ownership dummies to capture some ﬁrm heterogeneity
and control for the fraction of unionized workers and family members, whose presence is possibly
not orthogonal to the ﬁrms’ remunerations practices.18 In addition, we also include (log) capital
18We follow the usual practice in the labor literature of not including occupation variables in the wage equation.
A fraction of the return to human capital characteristics will be realized through changes in occupation, which
17in the wage equation. Note that the same controls that have been included throughout—hours
worked and time, industry, and location dummies—are maintained. The drawback of including
these extra variables is that we loose 8% of the ﬁrms in the sample, especially in Kenya.
Even though these additional controls tend to be jointly signiﬁcant in most equations, p-values
for the F-tests are reported at the bottom of Table 4(b), the main ﬁndings go through unchanged.
Equality of wage and productivity premiums is strongly rejected in Tanzania, tenuous in Kenya,
but cannot be rejected in Zimbabwe. The most notable diﬀerence is that schooling is now
underrewarded in Kenya and Zimbabwe, but the gap still decreases with the level of development,
respectively 4.5%, 3.1%, and 2.1% per year. The ﬁrm level controls have the expected eﬀect and
the signs are invariably the same in both equations: negative for state ownership and positive
for foreign ownership. Tellingly, family members receive higher salaries in Tanzania and Kenya,
even though ﬁrms that employ a high fraction of family have lower productivity. The gap is
signiﬁcant with a p-value of 2% in both countries. In contrast, in Zimbabwe family members
receive 17% higher salary, but are also estimated to be 7% more productive. This gap is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at all (p-value is 80%).
5.3 Diminishing returns
A shortcoming of the previous analysis is the imposition of linear eﬀects on the continuous
variables. The small sample makes it hard to identify nonlinearities precisely, but one would
certainly expect the returns to schooling and experience to be concave. An extra diﬃculty is that
in the aggregation from the individual to the ﬁrm level, a ﬁrst order approximation was made.
In order for the quadratic and interaction terms in the returns to schooling and experience to
make it into the estimating equation, a second order approximation is necessary.
At the individual level, human capital—and hence the wage rate—can be modeled to evolve
according to




i + λXSXiSi (10)
The Appendix contains the details how to derive a second order approximation for the production
function and to aggregate wages to the ﬁrm level in a way consistent with a Mincer model of
human capital at the individual level, as equation (10). Most importantly, in addition to the
squared and interaction terms of average schooling and experience, it requires the inclusion of the
average variances and covariance for experience and schooling within each ﬁrm in the regression.
These terms are missing in the ﬁrm level production function estimated by Jones (2001).
Estimation results are in Table 5. Changes relative to the benchmark results in Table 2(a) are
modest. The R-squares for the regressions hardly increase when quadratic terms are included.
The eﬀect of experience is estimated to be concave and increasing, except for the production
function in Tanzania, as before, where it is negative but at a diminishing rate. The same concave
are obviously endogenous.
18increasing pattern holds for schooling, except for the wage equation in Kenya. In the majority
of cases, education and experience are estimated to be complements, although few coeﬃcients
are statistically signiﬁcant.
The rejection of equality of wage and productivity eﬀects is more likely for Tanzania and
Kenya than for Zimbabwe, but the p-values become a lot larger. Unfortunately, this is not
because of closer estimates of wage and productivity eﬀects, but mostly because of less precise
estimates.
For Tanzania, the mismatch between the two premiums is now much more pronounced for
experience than for schooling. The point estimates on the linear terms are as dissimilar as before
and the quadratic terms also have opposite signs in the wage and production equations. The
schooling results are somewhat closer. The diﬀerence in linear terms is unchanged, but they are
estimated much less precisely, and the quadratic terms are very similar. The results for Kenya
are opposite. Allowing for diminishing returns almost entirely eliminates the discrepancy in
returns to experience. The p-value in the joint test for equality of all experience terms is only
as low as 0.15 because of the interaction term with schooling. However, the eﬀect of schooling
in both equations is now entirely unrelated.
[Table 5]
It is impossible to attach any ﬁrm conclusions given the imprecision of the estimates. Never-
theless, it is striking how similar the wage and productivity eﬀects remain for Zimbabwe. It is
the only country for which the signs on all coeﬃcients, including the quadratic and interaction
terms, are the same in both equations. The only noticeable diﬀerence is that schooling has a
less pronounced eﬀect on productivity, less strongly increasing and less concave, than on wages.
Evaluating the marginal returns to schooling and experience at the sample averages, gives results
that are close to the linear estimates. The average wage eﬀect of a year of schooling in Zimbabwe
is 8.5%, while the productivity eﬀect is 8.5%. In Tanzania, the two eﬀects are +1.6% and -0.6%,
while the corresponding eﬀects for Kenya are +6.7% and -1.8%. Similar discrepancies arise for
the average experience eﬀects, but now Tanzania has by far the biggest gap. Enforcing linearity
of the eﬀects does not seem to be the driving force behind the rejections in the poorer countries.
5.4 Sampling error
Till now we have treated the average employee-characteristics per ﬁrm as known, even though
they were estimated from a subsample of workers. It would be useful to know how sensitive
the results are to sampling of workers.19 Would the conclusions still hold if we had drawn a
19For 8% of the ﬁrms, all employees are observed and sampling is not an issue. On average, 30% of a ﬁrm’s
employees are interviewed, but the distribution is right-skewed. For half of all ﬁrms, we observe less than 18% of
the workers and for one out of ten ﬁrms, less than 2% of the workforce.
19diﬀerent sample of workers from each ﬁrm to calculate the average characteristics? We check
the robustness of the results using two diﬀerent approaches.
The ﬁrst method extends the approach in Hellerstein, et al. (1999) to deal with continuous
variables. Diﬀerent samples of workers are repeatedly drawn from the implied universe of em-
ployees, constructed to be consistent with the estimated proportions for each characteristic. For
example, a ﬁrm with 100 employees from which 6 men and 4 women were actually sampled, is
assumed to have a total of 60 male and 40 female workers. From this universe of 100 workers,
samples of 10 workers are drawn without replacement and the proportion of male workers in
each sample is used in new estimations. For continuous variables, schooling and experience, we
sample without replacement from the smoothed cumulative distribution function of the observed
sample of employees.
The samples are generated independently for all characteristics and ﬁrms, drawing for each
ﬁrm a hundred times the same number of workers as found in the original sample. For ﬁrms
where all employees are observed, the observed averages are used in each simulation. Using each
of the hundred simulated samples, the wage and production equations are estimated as in Table
2(a). The top panel of Table 6 contains the average coeﬃcient estimates and standard deviations
across all simulations. The average and standard deviation for the p-value of the Wald test for
equality of all coeﬃcients is also calculated, as well as the fraction of simulated samples where
the p-value is below the 5% signiﬁcance level.
[Table 6]
The original ﬁndings are virtually unchanged. In 99 of the samples, the joint test is rejected
for Tanzania, in only 59 of the Kenyan samples, and never for Zimbabwe. The nature of the
diﬀerences also remains the same. In the two poorer countries experience and schooling are
rewarded more than their contribution to output. In Zimbabwe, the remuneration matches the
productivity gain rather well and when they diﬀer, characteristics tend to be underrewarded.
The variability of the gender diﬀerentials is exacerbated in the simulations.
The simulations conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings, but it is not the ideal experiment. Assuming
that the estimated averages are the true underlying means, we veriﬁed whether the results are
robust to diﬀerent possible samples of workers. However, we would like to know what the results
would look like if the true means were used instead of the estimates. The observed averages are
consistent with a whole range of underlying true means, but not all values are equally likely,
given the observed sample of workers.
We can use Bayes’ law to calculate, for example, the probability that any randomly generated
number between 0 and 1 represents the true proportion of male workers in the ﬁrm, given the
observed sample of workers. The probability that the true mean diﬀers from the observed mean
by a certain amount is a decreasing function of the proportion of workers that are observed. If the
majority of all employees in the sample are observed, the true proportion of male workers in that
20ﬁrm cannot diﬀer a lot from the observed proportion. For discrete variables, we can calculate
this probability exactly for any (randomly generated) diﬀerence. For continuous variables, we
can calculate the probability that the true average lies in any interval, which we draw randomly
with constant width for each characteristic.20 We simply use Bayes’ law and the distribution
of the estimated mean. The law of large numbers tells us that the mean of any i.i.d. random
variable is normally distributed in the limit. From a set of observations we can consistently
estimate the mean and variance of the underlying random variables, and hence the ﬁrst two
moments of the distribution of the mean.21
The product of the probability for each of the three characteristics is then used as weight on
the ﬁrm in the SUR estimation. Firms for which all employees are observed, 8% of the sample,
receive a constant weight of one. As in the ﬁrst experiment, we draw 100 samples and the
average estimation results are reported in the bottom panel of Table 6.
The results for the second experiment are again similar to those in Table 2(a). Rejection
of the joint hypothesis is still unanimous for Tanzania. The results for Kenya and Zimbabwe
are found to diﬀer less than in the observed sample, but rejection of the joint hypothesis is still
more likely for Kenya. The average p-value for Zimbabwe drops to only 13%, even though the
hypothesis can only be rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level in 4 of the 100 samples, compared to
57 for Kenya. Relative to the previous simulations, the standard deviations of the estimated
coeﬃcients are higher.
5.5 Unobservables
We should not conclude that markets work ineﬃciently in Africa, simply because they look dif-
ferent from Western markets. Often, they simply adjusted to the speciﬁc circumstances, such as
information asymmetries, enforcement problems, and geographic isolation. For example, Ben-
jamin (1995) points out that some of the agricultural economics literature prematurely concluded
in favor of ineﬃcient markets to explain an inverse relationship between labor productivity and
farm size. Properly accounting for unobservable land quality, which was estimated to be higher
for smaller farms, completely eliminated the inverse productivity-size relationship.
Even more than for empirical work in developed countries, one should be aware of data
limitations. Unobservables like non-wage compensation or measurement errors in capital are
potentially problematic. In the current context, both of these measurement problems are likely
to work against ﬁnding the pattern documented.
Non-wage compensation is likely to rise with skill, just as in developed countries. In Africa,
this takes the form mostly of payments in kind, which tend to be more important in the least
20We use a diﬀerent width for the three characteristics, as their observed variance in the sample diﬀers a lot,
but is almost constant across countries.
21Its standard deviation is the estimated standard error over the square root of the number of workers inter-
viewed.
21developed countries, like Tanzania. Approximately 60% of the ﬁrms in the sample report how
much in kind payments they make. In some cases it is zero and in almost all instances it amounts
to less than 10% of total compensation. Adding payments in kind to the dependent variable of
the wage regression increases the premiums associated with schooling and experience slightly in
Tanzania, with little change for Kenya and Zimbabwe. This exacerbate the excess wage premium
for Tanzania, relative to the productivity premium.22
A second variable prone to measurement error is the capital stock. Throughout, the output
elasticity with respect to capital is estimated slightly higher for Tanzania (0.24-0.25) than for
Zimbabwe (0.21-0.23). It is possible that the capital coeﬃcient estimate for Tanzania is upward
biased. If the human capital measures are positively correlated with physical capital, as in
developed countries, such an upward bias could translate in a downward bias of the human
capital coeﬃcients. However, the diﬀerence is relatively small. Running the regressions for the
three countries as a system, enforcing uniform capital and labor coeﬃcients, had very little
impact on the estimated skill premiums.
6 Possible explanations
6.1 Imperfect substitution between characteristics
An important maintained assumption is the perfect substitutability between all types of workers.
If this is relaxed, the marginal product of a male worker, for example, will depend on the
share of male workers already employed and on other characteristics of the workforce. We now
explore whether allowing for imperfect substitutability between workers with diﬀerent levels of
experience changes the results. Recall that this characteristic had the greatest gap between
wage and productivity premiums in most previous tables.
The most straightforward approach would be to introduce two labor aggregates, one for each
experience level (Y or X), in the Cobb-Douglas production function:
lnQ = α0 + αK lnK + αX ln ˜ LX + αY ln ˜ LY + q (11)
ln ˜ Lk = lnLk + ln(1 + φkM
LkM
Lk
) + φkSSk x = Y, X, (12)
for schooling measured continuously. Data constraints force us, as before, to assume that the
fraction of male workers is the same in each experience category maintaining the assumptions
in (4): LXM/LX = LY M/LY = LM/L. Similarly, average schooling attainment is assumed
constant across experience categories as well. The elasticity of substitution between each type
of workers and between both types of workers and capital is unity. The output elasticities of
each input, αK, αY , and αX, capture the relative importance of capital, unexperienced, and
experienced workers in the production function.
22Full results are not reported, but available upon request. Only including ﬁrms that report payments in kind
reduces the sample and might entail a selection bias.
22An more general approach is to aggregate the two labor aggregates using the C.E.S. func-
tional form. While capital and (aggregate) labor still have unitary elasticity of substitution, the
elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerent labor components can be estimated freely. The
production function becomes





X + (1 − αX)˜ L
−ρ
Y ) + q.
The constant elasticity of substitution between the two labor types is σ = 1
1+ρ. If the weights
of the two experience categories sum to one, returns to scale still equal αK + αL. In principle,
it is straightforward to extend this approach and include more than two levels of experience. In
practice, it is impossible to calculate average schooling and fraction of males separately for more
narrowly deﬁned experience levels and the extra categories will not really yield a richer model.
The results are in the top panel of Table 7. The test for equality of returns to experience has
to be carried out diﬀerently than before. Dividing the cost minimizing ﬁrst order conditions for







wY . The relative
productivity of high versus low experience workers now varies across ﬁrms, depending on the
relative share of workers in each experience category. The reported p-value is for the test
evaluated at the mean ratio for each experience class.
[Table 7]
The estimates close mimic the results from Table 2(a). This is not surprising, as the two
types of labor are estimated to be close substitutes, in Zimbabwe even perfect substitutes. The
joint test is signiﬁcantly more likely to reject equality of returns in Tanzania and Kenya than
in Zimbabwe, which is still driven by the return to experience. In Tanzania, the premiums
for gender and schooling are estimated somewhat closer, but in Kenya the reverse is true. It
is interesting to note that the weight of more experienced workers in the production function
increases with the development level of the country, which would be expected if production
technology is more advanced in richer countries.
In Zimbabwe, experienced workers are perfect substitutes for young workers and their only
slightly higher relative weight 0.541
1−0.541 = 1.18 matches their only slightly higher wages relatively
well. In the other two countries, the higher wage return to experience combined with a lower
weight of experienced workers in the production function would lead cost minimizing ﬁrms to
hire a lot more unexperienced workers. In the test, the equalizing eﬀect of a higher ratio of
low to high experienced workers is dampened by the inverse of the elasticity of substitution.
Both types of workers are estimated to be rather close substitutes, hence, a much higher ratio
than observed would be required to rationalize the estimated wage eﬀects. In sum, imperfect
substitutability fails as an explanation for the rejection of equal wage and productivity returns.
The bottom panel of Table 7 reports results for a similar exercise, but now workers with high
or low schooling level are considered imperfect substitutes. For both Kenya and Zimbabwe the
23elasticity of substitution is now estimated at inﬁnity, indicating the Cobb-Douglas production
function is most appropriate. The p-values for the joint test for equality of the schooling and
experience premiums displays the same pattern as before: a clear rejection for Tanzania (p-value
is 0%) and failure to reject for Zimbabwe (p-value is 43%), with results for Kenya intermediate
(p-value is 4%).
Ideally, we would like to perform additional robustness checks on the deﬁnition of the human
capital characteristics. The limited number of workers interviewed per ﬁrm preclude us from
deﬁning the discrete schooling categories more ﬁnely or use more than two levels of experience or
tenure. Similarly, we cannot deﬁne the fraction of male workers or average years of experience
separately for high and low educated workers. At least the robustness of our ﬁndings when
continuous or discrete deﬁnitions of the characteristics are used is encouraging.
6.2 Localized labor markets
One feature of labor markets in developing countries that might help explaining the failure
of wage premiums to match productivity eﬀects is the segregation of economic activities by
geographic area. If workers rarely migrate between diﬀerent cities and daily commuting is
limited because of poor transportation infrastructure, pooling ﬁrms that operate in diﬀerent
areas can produce misleading results. Reardon (1997) surveys some evidence that suggests
localized labor markets are likely to be important in Africa.
The small sample size makes it impossible to run the regressions separately for all cities.
Location dummies are included in all previous regressions, but this might not suﬃce to control
for local eﬀects. If the relative wage rate for workers with high and low education varies by region
the wage diﬀerentials will only match productivity diﬀerences if ﬁrms are equally representative
in all areas. Given the concentration of manufacturing activities in only a few cities, this is
unlikely to be the case. Alternatively, if areas diﬀer in the relative abundance of diﬀerent types
of workers, this will give rise to diﬀerences in relative wages and ﬁrms will adjust their input
mix.
One solution is to perform the analysis on the sample of ﬁrms located in the major city of
each country. Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is one of the most important manufacturing centers
of East Africa and 350 of the 544 observations, 64% of the Kenyan sample, are located here.
In Tanzania, the main center of manufacturing activity is Arusha, near the border with Kenya,
rather than the capital Dar es Salaam. 41% of all ﬁrms in the sample are located there. In
Zimbabwe, manufacturing activity is less concentrated than in the other countries. Still, 42% of
the ﬁrms in the RPED sample are located in the capital, Harare.
[Table 8]
The estimation results on the limited samples are in Table 8. For Arusha (Tanzania), the gap
between wage and productivity eﬀects is slightly larger. The smaller sample yields less precise
24estimates and increases the p-value for the tests of equality of eﬀects. Nevertheless, for most
variables, especially for experience, we still reject equality and the same conclusion holds for the
joint test. Local labor markets do not seem to be an explanation for the excess wage return to
the diﬀerent characteristics.23
The results for Nairobi (Kenya) indicate that for experience the gap is cut in half, from 2.9%
to 1.4%. The point estimates for schooling and gender changed very little. As the rejection of
equality was mainly driven by the excess wage return to experience, the joint test for equality
of all three eﬀects now has a p-value of 0.25 and we fail to reject joint equality. Here, the local
labor market explanation seems to have some explanatory power. However, two things have
changed. On the one hand, limiting the sample to ﬁrms in a single city makes arbitrage easier
and the eﬀects of isolated labor markets should disappear. On the other hand, the manufacturing
centers tend to be much richer and more developed than the smaller cities. Nairobi is a lot more
developed than the rest of the country. Few detailed local statistics are available, but the U.N.
estimates that Nairobi alone generates 45% of Kenyan GDP.
For Zimbabwe, equality can never be rejected, even though the productivity eﬀect of experi-
ence is estimated substantially higher and higher than the wage eﬀect. The joint test for equality
of the returns to all three characteristics gives the same ranking across the three countries as
before: rejection is negatively correlated with the level of development in the country.
6.3 Long term contracts
One potential explanation for the diﬀerence between the wage and productivity premiums for
experience is the presence of long term contracts. In Tanzania, and to a lesser extent in Kenya,
older workers earn more than their contemporaneous productivity warrants, while the reverse is
true for younger workers. A similar pattern was found in France, see P´ erez-Duarte et al. (2001).
If contracts in the economy are such that pay is backloaded over the workers’ careers, wage
eﬀects at any given time might diﬀer from productivity eﬀects if the eﬀects are identiﬁed from
diﬀerences across ﬁrms.
A detailed analysis of wage proﬁles over a worker’s career is beyond the scope of this paper,
but the individual wage regressions in the working paper version Van Biesebroeck (2003) sheds
some light on this issue. Using standard panel data techniques, the total experience premium
is decomposed into within and between ﬁrm eﬀects. Comparing across countries clearly shows
that the decreasing experience premium with the level of development is driven predominantly
by the between ﬁrm eﬀect, picking up selection rather than career eﬀects. Salary increases
with experience within the same ﬁrm are similar, ranging from 1.1% in Zimbabwe to 1.9% in
Tanzania. Between ﬁrm diﬀerences in the remuneration of a year of experience vary much more,
from zero to 4.1% in the two respective countries. Long term career concerns seem to explain
only a fraction of the experience premium gap.
23The same conclusion is obtained for the full model that includes tenure and training, as in Table 3(a).
25It remains puzzling why individual ﬁrms would systematically over-reward experience. It
makes ﬁrms with an older than average workforce particularly uncompetitive. It would also
make more sense if these long term eﬀects were associated with tenure, but paradoxically we
ﬁnd the reverse. Workers with high tenure are paid less than their productivity warrants,
controlling for general labor market experience, especially in Tanzania. It is also puzzling why
these long term contact would be important in a very poor country as Tanzania, but not in a
more advanced economy as Zimbabwe.
6.4 Matching
If the labor market does not operate as a spot market with perfect information, one would
also expect to ﬁnd diﬀerences in wage and productivity premiums. For example, if workers are
matched with ﬁrms and bargain over the surplus of the match, we should not expect to see the
relative productivity match the relative wage perfectly. Firms will make wage oﬀers that lie
between the worker’s outside alternative (potentially very low) and the worker’s productivity.
Even in such an equilibrium, it is not obvious why workers in Tanzania and Kenya are system-
atically paid more than their experience and schooling level warrants. These characteristics are
readily observable and it is hard to rationalize ﬁrms oﬀering salaries that exceed productivity.
One explanation might be that the benchmark workers—young, uneducated women—are paid
less than their productivity warrants and that more educated or older workers have a better
bargaining position, bringing their salary closer to their productivity level. All eﬀects discussed
so far were always relative to the benchmark worker. There is some evidence for this in Tanzania.
Note that the constant term in the wage equation is related to the labor input coeﬃcient in the
production function. The ﬁrst order condition for the benchmark worker gives w0 = αLQ/L or
in logarithms λ0 = lnαL +ln(Q/L). For Tanzania we can reject that this expression holds with
equality at a 1% signiﬁcance level, evaluated at the average or median ﬁrm, indicating that the
benchmark category of workers is paid less than the productivity level. Therefore, higher wages
for educated or experienced workers can be rationalized by a better bargaining position of such
workers, without requiring any productivity eﬀects.
This still requires an explanation of why the extent to which less skilled workers have low
bargaining power is negatively correlated with the level of development of the country. A more
detailed study of the operation of local labor markets would be needed to explore this further.
It is not unlikely that in a poor agriculture-focused economy the outside options for unskilled
manufacturing workers are especially bad, but we do not have evidence for this. At least it oﬀers
a way to rationalize the observed wage-productivity gaps while maintaining cost minimizing
behavior on the part of ﬁrms. Other institutional, social, or cultural considerations can lead
ﬁrms to oﬀer wage proﬁles over workers’ careers or salary diﬀerences between household members
that drive a wedge between the contemporaneous productivity eﬀect and salary remuneration.
267 Conclusions
A couple of ﬁndings are worth reiterating. First, wage premiums associated with a number
of characteristics do not always match their productivity contributions and this failure is more
pronounced for some countries than for other. Equality of the two premiums is much more likely
to be rejected in the poorest economy we study, Tanzania, than in the relatively richer country,
Zimbabwe. This pattern is very robust.
Second, a lot of attention in the development literature is devoted to education. Rightfully
so, because the rewards in terms of higher salary and output are important and we only capture
a part of them in this analysis. It is nevertheless of concern that the wage increases associated
with more education signiﬁcantly exceed the productivity gains they bring in the least developed
countries. It is still instructive to realize that the returns to education—privately and to the
employers—are highest in the most developed country. Education is important, but the beneﬁts
do not materialize automatically.
Third, a crucial aspect of remuneration practices is the trade-oﬀ between paying workers for
general experience versus ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure. This mirrors a similar trade-oﬀ between general
pre-employment education and training programs for employees. In Tanzania, and to a lesser
extent in Kenya, general skills (experience and schooling) are rewarded relatively more than ﬁrm-
speciﬁc skills (tenure and training) even though the latter are associated with larger productivity
gains. In Zimbabwe, all wage premiums match the productivity gains that are associated with
them, and even more interestingly, the returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments are higher than in
the other countries. A richer model of human capital accumulation and remuneration is needed
to understand these relationships better.
Ineﬃciencies in the labor market are one explanation for the wage-productivity discrepancies,
but there are others. We have shown that localized labor markets could be important and that
allowing for diminishing returns and imperfect substitutability between skills lowers some of the
gaps. Long term contracts or especially weak bargaining power of unskilled workers in poor
countries could also be part of the explanation. A more in-depth study of local labor market
practices is needed to sort out these eﬀects.
27Table 1: Summary statistics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
Population 27.1m 25.0m 10.3m
% employed in industry 4.9% 7.3% 8.6%
Manufacturing workersa 126,312 177,738 18,7937
Workers in sample ﬁrmsb 19,383 21,090 58,108
Workers in the sampleb 1,018 1,206 619
GDP/capita (PPP) 395 1089 2459
VA/empl. in industry (USD) 983 1705 7049
Median LP in samplec 38 100 142
Median TFP in samplec 54 100 143
Monthly wage (USD) 55.9 (58.6) 117.0 (322.2) 203.3 (261.3)
Share of GDP covered 0.31 0.17 0.26
Share of labor force covered 0.15 0.12 0.31
Number of ﬁrms 113 183 110
Value added (log) 11.0 (2.52) 10.0 (2.62) 9.92 (2.29)
Capital stock (log) 11.5 (3.15) 10.3 (3.13) 9.19 (2.64)
Employment (log) 3.01 (1.62) 3.16 (1.73) 4.50 (1.56)
Hours worked (log) 3.85 (0.23) 3.83 (0.15) 3.82 (0.17)
Employment 106.2 (311.1) 99.8 (270.5) 275.6 (594.9)
Workers interviewed per ﬁrm 5.6 (3.2) 6.2 (3.4) 5.6 (2.6)
Monthly salary (log) 9.59 (0.53) 7.85 (0.65) 6.68 (0.75)
Male (%) 0.79 (0.40) 0.87 (0.34) 0.84 (0.36)
Experience (years) 16.4 (10.4) 16.1 (9.8) 19.9 (10.8)
Schooling (years) 12.4 (4.8) 11.5 (3.8) 11.0 (3.6)
Tenure (years) 7.8 (6.9) 7.9 (7.2) 10.3 (8.2)
Experience (% high) 0.49 (0.33) 0.47 (0.32) 0.45 (0.33)
Schooling (% high) 0.28 (0.30) 0.49 (0.34) 0.57 (0.31)
Tenure (% high) 0.41 (0.36) 0.41 (0.33) 0.46 (0.37)
Received training (%) 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.32) 0.21 (0.41)
Sources: World Bank (2000) and own calculations for the sample statistics, a UNIDO, 1991
b in ﬁrst year; c relative to Kenya, see Van Biesebroeck (2005)
Notes: Aggregate statistics refer to 1992, unless indicated, and ﬁrm and worker level statistics
refer to the ﬁrst year of the survey, 1992 for Tanzania and 1991 for the other two countries.
28Table 2: (a) Joint estimation of wage and production equations, limited continuous characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.828 0.779 0.816
(.078)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.066)∗∗∗
Capital 0.241 0.292 0.218
(.037)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Male 0.148 0.839 0.030 1.828 -0.015 -0.007
(.135) (.731) (.123) (1.11)∗ (.214) (.267)
Experience 0.020 -0.024 0.029 0.003 0.007 0.015
(.004)∗∗∗ (.014)∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.012) (.007) (.009)∗
Schooling 0.059 -0.002 0.091 0.051 0.080 0.066
(.009)∗∗∗ (.034) (.011)∗∗∗ (.030)∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.31 0.69 0.32 0.81 0.37 0.88
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.34 0.09 0.48
Experience (λA − φA) 0.00 0.01 0.36
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.07 0.16 0.67
Joint test 0.01 0.04 0.36
Notes: Joint estimation (SUR) of the wage equation and production function at the ﬁrm level. The
sample for Tanzania covers three years, 1992-1994, for Kenya also three years, 1991-1994, and for
Zimbabwe two years, 1991-1992. Controls in both equations include hours worked and time, industry,
and location dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses; ∗∗∗ indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level,
∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%.
29Table 2: (b) Joint estimation of wage and production equations, limited discrete characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.799 0.775 0.820
(.076)∗∗∗ (.058)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗
Capital 0.240 0.296 0.215
(.035)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Male 0.388 0.902 0.185 1.869 0.147 0.270
(.174)∗∗ (.845) (.137) (1.04)∗ (.288) (.410)
Experience 0.280 -0.494 0.151 -0.207 0.523 0.716
(.109)∗∗∗ (.155)∗∗∗ (.087)∗ (.159) (.297)∗ (.427)∗
Schooling 0.746 0.161 0.452 0.148 1.650 1.320
(.138)∗∗∗ (.365) (.112)∗∗∗ (.232) (.556)∗∗∗ (.635)∗∗
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.32 0.69 0.35 0.81 0.41 0.89
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.54 0.10 0.78
Experience (λA − φA) 0.00 0.04 0.67
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.12 0.21 0.65
Joint test 0.00 0.04 0.77
Note: Estimation as in Table 2(a).
30Table 3: (a) Joint estimation of wage and production equations, full set of continuous characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.796 0.758 0.808
(.084)∗∗∗ (.070)∗∗∗ (.066)∗∗∗
Capital 0.251 0.292 0.213
(.041)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Male 0.213 0.981 0.313 2.664 -0.106 0.239
(.166) (0.98) (.193)∗ (1.99) (.190) (.434)
Experience 0.026 -0.024 0.027 0.000 0.005 0.004
(.006)∗∗∗ (.019) (.006)∗∗∗ (.020) (.009) (.014)
Schooling 0.066 0.016 0.094 0.021 0.105 0.101
(.010)∗∗∗ (.038) (.013)∗∗∗ (.041) (.021)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
Tenure -0.020 -0.005 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.017
(.008)∗∗∗ (.026) (.009) (.026) (.012) (.018)
Received training 0.043 0.695 0.196 0.748 0.782 0.452
(.170) (.841) (.148) (.587) (.232)∗∗∗ (.327)
Observations 268 268 375 375 210 210
R2 0.26 0.69 0.34 0.80 0.40 0.88
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test—without male 0.05 0.15 0.90
Joint test—ﬁrm speciﬁc HC 0.59 0.63 0.62
Joint test—general HC 0.03 0.16 0.99
Joint test—learning 0.30 0.11 0.62
Joint test—over time 0.03 0.25 0.97
Notes: Estimation as in Table 2(a). Information on training is missing for some ﬁrms in Tanzania
and in the last year for all Kenyan ﬁrms, hence the smaller sample sizes.
31Table 3: (b) Joint estimation of wage and production equations, full set of discrete characteristics
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Labor 0.768 0.811 0.835
(.080)∗∗∗ (.070)∗∗∗ (.067)∗∗∗
Capital 0.260 0.292 0.232
(.041)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Male 0.566 1.254 0.853 2.718 -0.055 0.095
(.240)∗∗ (1.17) (.303)∗∗∗ (1.99) (.218) (.350)
Experience 0.297 -0.398 0.355 -0.187 0.270 0.424
(.146)∗∗ (.215)∗ (.147)∗∗ (.249) (.265) (.401)
Schooling 0.835 0.190 0.958 0.193 2.133 2.330
(.162)∗∗∗ (.404) (.168)∗∗∗ (.317) (.640)∗∗∗ (1.02)∗∗
Tenure -0.033 -0.231 0.310 0.523 0.784 1.028
(.104) (.281) (.141)∗∗ (.474) (.309)∗∗∗ (.496)∗∗
Received training -0.068 0.754 0.061 0.610 0.840 0.418
(.158) (.810) (.136) (.512) (.262)∗∗∗ (.312)
Observations 268 268 375 375 213 213
R2 0.34 0.69 0.38 0.80 0.45 0.88
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.04 0.65
Joint test—ﬁrm speciﬁc HC 0.53 0.52 0.47
Joint test—general HC 0.01 0.02 0.93
Joint test—learning 0.22 0.12 0.47
Joint test—over time 0.00 0.05 0.75
Note: Estimation as in Table 3(a).
32Table 4: Joint estimation of wage and production equations, two robustness checks
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
(a) Translog production function
Male 0.126 1.213 0.027 1.283 -0.215 0.107
(.138) (1.14) (.122) (.666)∗ (.147) (.295)
Experience 0.020 -0.031∗ 0.026 -0.003 0.006 0.009
(.004)∗∗∗ (.016) (.004)∗∗∗ (.010) (.187) (.009)
Schooling 0.059 -0.014 0.090 0.051 0.070 0.074
(.011)∗∗∗ (.037) (.011)∗∗∗ (.026)∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.31 0.69 0.32 0.82 0.49 0.89
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Experience (λX − φX) 0.00 0.01 0.79
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.05 0.15 0.91
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.02 0.97
Test whether second order production function coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant (p-values)
0.33 0.02 0.25
(b) Additional controls in (Cobb-Douglas) production function and wage equation
Male 0.090 0.885 0.146 2.079 -0.346 -0.036
(.138) (.820) (.129) (1.38) (.109)∗∗∗ (.283)
Experience 0.018 -0.037 0.014 -0.011 0.006 0.009
(.005)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.013) (.007) (.011)
Schooling 0.059 0.014 0.041 0.072 0.038 0.059
(.013)∗∗∗ (.039) (.011)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗ (.021)∗ (.034)∗
Observations 297 297 485 485 206 206
R2 0.34 0.67 0.49 0.81 0.57 0.88
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Experience (λX − φX) 0.00 0.04 0.73
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.25 0.38 0.51
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.03 0.81
Test whether additional controls are jointly signiﬁcant (p-values)
0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07
Estimation as in Table 2(a), adding second order terms—log
2(˜ L), log
2(K), and log(˜ L) ∗ log(K)—to
the production function in (a) and additional controls—foreign and state ownership dummies, the
fraction of the workforce that is unionized or a family member, and capital—to both equations in (b).
33Table 5: Joint estimation of wage and production equations with diminishing returns and inter-
action between schooling and experience
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Male -0.011 1.480 -0.117 2.254 -0.089 0.146
(.135) (1.31) (.113) (1.56) (.175) (.402)
Experience 0.001 -0.046 0.053 0.062 0.068 0.064
(.014) (.021)∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
Experience2 (× 100) -0.019 0.012 -0.153 -0.219 -0.817 -0.697
(.037) (.092) (.047)∗∗∗ (.115)∗ (.126)∗∗∗ (.263)∗∗∗
Schooling 0.065 0.011 -0.007 0.086 0.067 0.018
(.044) (.117) (.037) (.076) (.052) (.100)
Schooling2 (× 100) -0.131 -0.138 0.353 -0.102 -0.184 -0.047
(.200) (.296) (.181)∗ (.456) (.681) (1.10)
Experience × Schooling 0.217 0.035 0.233 -0.603 0.040 0.365
(× 100) (.132)∗ (.361) (.190) (.349)∗ (.226) (.485)
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.30 0.70 0.34 0.80 0.39 0.87
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Joint test – linear terms 0.08 0.20 0.83
Joint test – all excluding male 0.31 0.24 0.69
Joint test – schooling terms 0.79 0.12 0.77
Joint test – experience terms 0.18 0.15 0.84
Estimation as in Table 2(a), including variance, covariance, and squared terms,
as derived in the Appendix.
34Table 6: Joint estimation of wage and production equations on simulated samples, sensitivity
analysis for sampling error
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
(a) New samples are drawn from the implied universe of workers:
Male 0.179 0.627 0.026 1.526 -0.003 0.282
(.042)∗∗∗ (.106)∗∗∗ (.050) (.160)∗∗∗ (.126) (.155)∗
Experience 0.016 -0.021 0.020 -0.005 0.003 0.005
(.002)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.005) (.004) (.005)
Schooling 0.048 -0.001 0.071 0.046 0.082 0.073
(.003)∗∗∗ (.009) (.004)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
average 0.0008 (.011) 0.059 (.050) 0.600 (.237)
Proportion below 5% 0.99 0.59 0.00
(b) New samples are drawn and weighted consistent with the observed means
for male, experience, and schooling
Male 0.327 1.523 0.037 0.650 0.033 0.293
(.024)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗ (.048) (0.112)∗∗∗ (.041) (.069)∗∗∗
Experience 0.023 -0.071 0.033 0.008 0.020 0.041
(.002)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.002)∗ (.005)∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Schooling 0.087 -0.031 0.104 0.037 0.116 0.190
(.003)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.020)∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
average 0.000 (.000) 0.059 (.059) 0.133 (.067)
Proportion below 5% 1.00 0.57 0.04
In brackets are the standard deviations of the coeﬃcient estimates across simulations.
See text, Section 5.4, for details on the simulations. Sample sizes are as in Table 2(a).
35Table 7: Joint estimation of wage and production equations with imperfect substitutability
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
(a) Imperfect substitution between high-low experience
Male 0.242 0.586 0.035 1.923 0.045 0.368
(.141)∗ (.631) (.124) (1.14)∗ (.230) (.470)
Schooling 0.053 0.001 0.088 0.052 0.063 0.069
(.009)∗∗∗ (.031) (.011)∗∗∗ (.030)∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.030)∗∗
Experience (high vs. low) 0.344 0.669 0.032
(.117)∗∗∗ (.137)∗∗∗ (.187)
Weight for high-experience 0.352 0.459 0.541
(.074)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗
Elasticity of substitution 5.957 3.035 ∞
(9.38) (1.46)∗∗ –
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.29 0.69 0.31 0.81 0.37 0.89
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Experience (λX − φX) 0.00 0.00 0.63
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.09 0.25 0.85
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.00 0.89
(b) Imperfect substitution between high-low schooling level
Male 0.294 1.030 0.427 2.358 -0.090 0.505
(.162)∗ (.889) (.182)∗∗ (1.38)∗ (.176) (.465)
Experience 0.013 -0.025 0.021 -0.006 0.010 0.020
(.004)∗∗∗ (.014)∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.011) (.007) (.010)∗∗
Schooling (high vs. low) 0.665 1.038 0.867
(.150)∗∗∗ (.153)∗∗∗ (.346)∗∗
Weight for high-schooling 0.538 0.590 0.738
(.056)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗
Elasticity of substitution 2.758 ∞ ∞
(1.37)∗∗ – –
Observations 316 316 544 544 210 210
R2 0.32 0.69 0.35 0.81 0.50 0.89
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-values)
Experience (λX − φX) 0.01 0.02 0.32
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.01 0.10 0.21
Joint test—without male 0.00 0.04 0.43
Estimation as in Table 2(a), except for imperfect substitutability between workers and CES production
function. Tests for equality of wage and productivity premium for experience in (a) and schooling in (b)
are evaluated at the sample mean. See Section 6.1 for details.
36Table 8: Joint estimation of wage and production equations, limited to ﬁrms in the principal city
Tanzania Kenya Zimbabwe
wage output wage output wage output
Male -0.042 0.948 0.034 1.976 0.770 1.002
(.189) (1.13) (.152) (1.19)∗ (.861) (1.22)
Experience 0.019 -0.034 0.023 0.009 0.013 0.033
(.008)∗∗ (.021)∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.013) (.015) (.020)∗
Schooling 0.052 -0.010 0.107 0.072 0.128 0.118
(.015)∗∗∗ (.040) (.015)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗
Observations 127 127 350 350 88 88
R2 0.18 0.73 0.20 0.84 0.30 0.87
Test for equality of coeﬃcients (p-value)
Male (λM − φM) 0.37 0.10 0.85
Experience (λA − φA) 0.01 0.30 0.36
Schooling (λS − φS) 0.12 0.34 0.86
Joint test 0.05 0.25 0.43
Estimation as in Table 2(a), limited to ﬁrms in the principal manufacturing city in the country:
Arusha in Tanzania, Nairobi in Kenya, and Harare in Zimbabwe.
37Appendix: Second order approximation of the production function
Following the derivation in Frazer (2001), the productivity adjusted labor aggregate ˜ L for a
ﬁrm with L workers that is consistent with a Mincer model of human capital with diminishing












where the summation is over all workers in the ﬁrm. We write down the terms in a second
order Taylor expansion of this function that contain schooling. Similar terms for experience and
gender are omitted as their treatment is identical.





















































Straightforward algebra yields the following results:



































































The same calculations can be performed for the derivatives with respect to Xi. Substituting all












i SiXi − ¯ S ¯ X gives












L | {z }
(SiXi)
+....
To introduce this labor aggregate in the estimation, we need to calculate the variance and
covariance of schooling and experience by ﬁrm, as well as the average of schooling and experience
squared. For gender, rather than taking the derivatives, we use the assumptions in (4) which
leads to a term ln(1 + φM
LM
L ) in the estimating equation, as before. This amounts to factoring
out the gender eﬀect from the f(.) function before taking the second order approximation of the
remainder.
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